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My purpose in this presentation is to give an overview or perspective on the financial 
situation in U.S. agriculture. Since descriptions of the situation are generally available 
(Easterbrook, J. Lee, Melichar-1985, ERS-USDA, van Blokland), I'll only briefly review the 
problem and its roots. The major emphasis of my presentation is devoted to two areas: 
difficulties in addressing current financial problems of the sector, and issues which deserve 
consideration for the future. 
The Problem and Its Roots 
A number of analysts have written on the 
causes of the agricultural difficulties in the 
1980s (Drabenstott, Duncan and Norris; Dun-
can and Harrington; W. Lee). Each seems to 
have a favorite set of causes. The recipe for 
agriculture's financial problems might be de-
scribed thus: 
take 3 cups high real and nominal interest 
rates, 
one   tablespoon adjustable interest rate 
loans, 
two cups overuse of debt, 
one cup "balance sheet" lending, 
one and one half cups changes in interna-
tional monetary exchange rates, 
three tablespoons worldwide recession, 
three cups unexpected disinflation, 
two shakes drought, 
two cups changes in price supports and gov-
ernment programs. 
Mix vigorously with incorrect expectations. 
Give the mixture time to work. 
While there is some agreement on the ingre-
dients, there is still much argument about the 
relative measures! 
Another view is that the present "crisis" is 
but a continuation of the outmigration from 
agriculture that has been occurring since the 
late 1930s, and in fact, is even now occurring 
at a less dramatic pace than in the 1955—65 
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period. This view holds that decisions farmers 
and lenders made in the 1970s were correct 
given the information at the time. That is, the 
signals concerning inflation, exchange rates, 
government programs and other factors were 
"wrong signals" and convinced resource 
owners that real estate values were justified. 
Balance sheet lending based on those signals 
led to overuse of credit in capitalizing farm 
units. The lessons of the 1930s were forgotten 
in the 1970s. 
Whatever recipe one favors, an important 
point, it seems to me, is that a number of rea-
sons played a part in contributing to the 1980s 
financial problems of agriculture. Consistent 
with a complex, varied, diverse, wide-ranging 
farming system, important causes depended 
on the characteristics of the farm business, the 
operator and the family, as well as economic 
and environmental circumstances. 
The symptoms of the farm level problem, in 
my estimation, include low sector returns, 
falling asset values, inability of a relatively 
large proportion of farmers to service their 
debt obligations, and higher proportions of 
farmers than usual being forced out of fanning. 
Interestingly, size characteristics of those 
forced out does not seem to be significantly 
different than the average of all farms, i.e. it is 
not a problem of small, inefficient producers. 
The problem seems newsworthy, in part, be-
cause of the importance of our food supply, 
the numbers of people affected, the special 
feeling the public has toward the family farm, 
and the not too distant roots most of us have in 
rural areas and in the soil. 
The problem, I think, consists of two parts. 
One is the distribution of debt. Perhaps 10- Brake 
20% of farm operators have debt that they 
cannot service. Most of these operators will be 
forced out of farming or at least into a sub-
stantially changed mode of operation. The 
second part is too many resources in agricul-
ture resulting in excess production. Extra re-
sources came into agriculture, or remained in, 
during the 70s due to market signals and farm 
profitability. Further, .continued technological 
change, encouraged by tax incentives, led to 
the need for fewer resources to satisfy produc-
tion demands. 
Raup underlines that effective adjustment 
must address the resource issue. He believes, 
however, that adjustment should focus on the 
nonhuman factors—that restriction on land 
resources, for example, could raise returns for 
the sector, and fewer human resources would 
need to exit. The issue of ways to minimize 
outmigration of people is useful to consider. 
Part-time farmers, of which there are many 
in the Northeast and South, have found an 
answer consistent with Raup's position. They 
own land counted as part of agriculture; yet, 
they generate substantial cash flow from non-
farm sources to supplement their farm income. 
Given a problem of excess resources leading 
to low returns, the economic adjustment is 
predictable in form (Breimyer), if not in timing: 
1) Durable assets will fall in value reflecting 
decreased earning power. Some resources will 
leave the sector, others will shift to lower value 
uses, but nearly all durable resources will be 
devalued by the market. 2) Devaluation will 
occur until excess production is corrected by 
some combination of lower quantity produced 
and increased quantity taken from the market. 
Devaluation will cease when a new entrant can 
buy productive assets and earn a satisfactory 
(competitive, opportunity, historical have been 
used as benchmarks) rate of return. 3) A major 
issue in this ongoing adjustment (Bullock, 
Melichar-1984), is how the wealth (capital) 
losses will be distributed among farm real estate 
owners, farm operators, lenders, and the 
general public. The first two consequences are 
already well underway, and the third is being 
answered by default if not by active decision 
making. 
Another serious concern is the second-order 
effects of the farm level problem on the 
financial support system of the agricultural 
sector. Characteristics of this facet include the 
large number of agricultural and rural bank 
failures, the Farm Credit System difficulties 
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that led to request for special government 
funds to aid the system, the large proportion of 
the FmHA portfolio in delinquency or default 
status, the large-scale writedown of, and 
defaults on, land purchase contract balances, 
and the increased losses on accounts receiv-
ables of farm input suppliers. 
Critical, but having received less attention, is 
the ripple effect on rural communities. There 
are at least two dimensions: one is the 
structural change occurring among input sup-
pliers—machinery dealers, elevators, etc.— 
proportionately more of whom have experi-
enced defaults and business failures than have 
farmers. The impact may spread to product-
buyers as adjustments in output occur. The 
second dimension includes loss of rural busi-
nesses, lowered property values serving as a 
tax base, higher unemployment, and generally 
declining absolute employment levels. While 
we perceive many of these rural community 
effects, they are as yet poorly documented. 
Difficulties in Addressing Current 
Financial Problems 
Data-conceptualization Problems 
As the financial problems of agriculture devel-
oped, policymakers and professionals desired 
data describing the extent of the problem. 
Without a good conceptualization of the prob-
lem, data availability tended to dictate the nature 
of the description. Very quickly, debt asset 
ratios became the  description of the financial 
crisis. In fact, cash flows, ability to service 
debt, or debt service plus funds available for 
new capital purchases would have been 
preferable measures of the extent of financial 
problems. Profitability analyses also would 
have been helpful. Early data did not well 
describe the financial problems, and they tended 
to focus on but one of several characteristics, 
some of which were more important than the 
one presented. As the financial problem 
developed, it became apparent that the quality 
of data on agricultural debt, debt service, cash 
flows, and related items left much to be 
desired. Further, a discrepancy arose between 
debt data from the Balance Sheet of the 
Farming Sector and debt data from the Farm 
Production Expenditure Survey of USDA. We 
were unsure how much farm debt was 
outstanding and who owed it. 88    October 1986 
Policies inconsistent with market forces 
Too often in our policy approaches to farm 
problems, we have overlooked a criterion of 
consistency with market forces. Examples are 
many within the context of the need for capital to 
move out of agriculture: 1) Increasing support 
prices beyond levels required to produce 
needed food; 2) Subsidized interest rates, federal 
government interest rate buy downs, and 
principal forgiveness; 3) Tax shelters en-
couraging investment in agriculture; 4) Tax 
laws which discourage farmers from exiting the 
sector because of the substantial tax obligation 
that might be incurred, even when net worth of 
the discontinuing farmer is zero or less; 5) State 
programs to aid beginning farmers at subsidized 
interest rates; 6) Lack of state and federal 
programs to help distressed, failing, 
economically marginal farm families move out 
of agriculture and into productive employment 
outside farming. 
Beneficiaries of "farm policy" 
Typically, the ultimate benefits of farm policy 
accrue to the consumer. Price supports that 
reduce risks without adequate production con-
trols virtually insure lower prices. Subsidized, 
low interest credit at the margin encourages 
resources into, or to stay in, agricultural pro-
duction when they can not earn a market rate 
of return. And even when farm policy does 
result in higher returns or higher asset values, 
benefits tend to be capitalized into assets 
thereby benefiting farm operators only as farm 
asset owners. 
A related point needs emphasis. For decades 
we have combined and confused policies to 
assist in the development of agriculture (i.e. 
agricultural policy) and policies to assist those 
who are unable to adjust to the current realities 
of the agricultural situation (social policies). In 
trying to solve two different objectives with 
one set of policies, we have usually failed to 
solve either. Let's recognize that both are 
important but that each needs its own set of 
policies. Further, let us also recognize that 
general economic policy is as important, if not 
more important, than farm policy, in its effects 
on agriculture. 
Similarly, policies of encouraging innova-
tion, entrepreneurship, and development of 
new technologies put farmers on a treadmill 
having to run to keep up. While innovators and 
excellent managers benefit, sometimes greatly 
in the short run, ultimate benefits get 
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'passed through to consumers through lower prices 
brought about by expanded production and 
inelastic demand. The relatively low variable costs 
of production compared to fixed (sunk) costs then 
tend to exacerbate and continue the 
overproduction mode for some period of time. I 
do not argue that policy benefits should be 
otherwise; I do suggest it's important to recognize 
this fact when devising policies and programs to 
deal with sector financial difficulties. 
Short-run versus long-run 
Farmer decisions, lender, and federal policies 
seem to assume that if, somehow, farmers can 
be helped to hold on for just another year or 
two, things will return to ''normal'', and they'll be 
okay. Economic forces will push toward a norm, 
but that norm is not likely to be the 1970s 
mode. The major models of the agricultural 
sector (Womack, et.  a/., Penson and Hughes) 
give little hope for a substantial turnaround in 
the near future. Overcommitment of resources, 
large stocks of grains, and relative oversupply 
of many commodities are consistent with a 
longer term problem. Moreover, these same 
features characterize most of the developed 
countries of the world; and like it or not, we are 
in a "world class" competition. Barring some 
major disaster, there is little reason to expect 
substantial improvement within the next 
several years. (Chernobyl reminded us that the 
probability of that is greater than 0.) 
This underlines the need to emphasize longer 
term policies (Barry and Boehlje), their 
consistency with longer term market forces, 
and specific consideration of objectives of the 
food and fiber system—all within a worldwide 
dimension. Unfortunately, it seems that our 
political decision makers can not address any 
issue beyond the newest "brush fire", or at best, 
the next election. In fact, it seems the more 
critical the problem and the more the public 
awareness, the shorter run is the emphasis. The 
three person Board of Governors specified for 
the Farm Credit Administration in the 
December 23, 1985, Farm Credit Act, which 
was to be appointed within 30 days, required 
over four months for selection. The 15 member 
commission to consider the future of the Farm 
Credit System which was also to be appointed 
within 30 days of that Act, and was to report 
back to the Congress within the year, has not 
yet been appointed in the six months that have 
passed. Brake 
Stereotyping of farmers 
There are at least two bothersome aspects of 
this point. One is the tendency to forget the 
difference between farm operators and farm 
resource owners, in effect, to view all farmers 
as being both. There are important differences 
between them in terms of rewards for function 
performed. 
A second erroneous stereotype, due in part, 
perhaps, to one-sided media coverage, is that 
all or most fanners earn low returns. Many 
farmers, perhaps 10%, do have low returns in 
spite of excellent efficiency. Others have low 
returns because of poor efficiency. Many, per-
haps 10-15%, were caught suddenly in ad-
verse situations due to circumstances beyond 
their immediate control. These were often re-
lated to farm type. Yet, there are many farm 
operators making impressive returns. We too 
often forget this group as well as the tremen-
dous variability within the sector. 
Issues Needing Attention for the Future 
A number of issues need attention for the fu-
ture. 
1.  Sharpen and change policy focus. 
Policies to address the financial problems of 
agriculture must both promote the transition of 
economically failing human resources out of 
agriculture, and simultaneously but separately, 
implement viable means to help other 
potentially productive human resources to re-
main. 
A large proportion of past programs has been 
ineffective to inappropriate in dealing with 
elements of the current farm financial crisis. 
For example, policies to provide subsidized, 
low interest credit whether to help highly 
indebted farmers stay in farming or new entrants 
to get started in farming, amount to making 
marginal capital available to the sector at lower 
than market rates of interest. These are policies 
consistent with continuing a low marginal rate 
of return to investment in farming. They not 
only won't solve the problem, they contribute 
to it. It would be preferable to develop state and 
federal programs to aid people at the financial 
margin to adjust. Alternatives include part time 
farming where off farm work is available. 
Changing of enterprises to more labor 
intensive, less capital intensive 
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types is another. In other cases we should aid 
people to get out of fanning by helping them 
find, and promoting, better opportunities for 
them outside of farming (Jones). One difficulty 
with this latter approach is that, in general, the 
agricultural leadership and the politicians have 
difficulty in publicly supporting such policies. 
Alternatively, if the problem in agriculture is 
viewed as one of excessive non-human re-
sources in production, then solutions need to 
address means of increasing returns to human 
capital, perhaps by restricting, retiring, or de-
creasing use of nonhuman resources. The 
means, however, must reward human capital 
rather than the limited and constrained nonhu-
man resources which have received the capi-
talized benefits in past public programs. That 
is, means must be found to separate rewards 
from price per unit of production or ownership 
of real estate. 
Related to this point, we need to examine the 
critical role of economies of size and of small 
to middle-size, efficient, small businesses in 
agriculture. This effort would help us focus on 
policies that could assist the efficient family 
farm in competing with superfarms without 
having to save all small farms or inflicting large 
inefficiencies on the system. Such policies might 
include restricting the access of superfarms to 
economic development monies, directing 
public research and extension dollars toward 
size-neutral technologies and programs, and 
developing publicly supported strategies to 
assist smaller farms in capturing economies of 
size. 
2. Promote an "attitude adjustment" in 
agriculture. 
Agriculture has attitude problems. One example 
is the feeling that we should not let farmers fail. 
Is farming so special or so essential that we 
should guarantee survival for anyone who wants 
to farm? I think not. This attitude makes 
transition out of farming especially difficult. 
Our studies in New York State suggest that 
transition is substantially less stressful to those 
who see themselves as managers, businessmen, 
and decision makers than it is for those who see 
themselves as farmers with no alternatives. 
Another problem is the attitude among 
farmers and farm leaders against use of social 
service agencies. This attitude makes it difficult, 
and in some cases even impossible, for needy 
farm families to access the social services 
safety net. The attitude keeps the ag- 90    October 1986 
ricultural leadership from addressing the prob-
lem of farmer eligibility for the social services 
safety net that should be available to them. 
We see families forced to exit agriculture 
whose assets are completely tied up in bank-
ruptcy courts or liquidation proceedings. They 
have no cash flow or income to live on, often 
for weeks; yet, they are denied social services 
because of the asset ownership eligibility cri-
terion. Even with no net worth and little or no 
income, these farm families can not qualify for 
needed social services. They get no help from 
their own agricultural leadership in pleading 
their cause. 
A corollary of the above attitude is that 
Cooperative Extension's charge is to work 
only with farmers; i.-e., extension should not 
work with farmers in transition because they 
will no longer be farmers. This attitude is com-
monplace in extension advisory committees 
who give less than full support to agents working 
with exiting farmers. The attitude is prevalent 
also in farm organizations which typically do 
not support extension efforts to help families 
leaving the sector. 
Attitudes also differ as to whether farming is a 
way of life or a business. Clearly, farming 
may be thought of as a way of life, but it can 
not survive as a way of life if it does not sur-
vive as a business. In my opinion, our teaching 
and extension programs must help students of 
all ages to become conscious decision-makers. 
Mistakes are a part of the learning process. 
When one does not succeed in a business 
venture, it should not be viewed as a failure of 
the human being but of that business decision. 
Successful entre-preneurship whether in the 
small business area of family farming or in 
some other small business area can help one 
attain the "good life" whether it be in farming, 
rural living, a college community, or some other 
life style. 
A final attitude problem is that of "doom 
and gloom" which needs to be replaced with 
the reality of life in a competitive economy: 
i.e., the need to make major changes from 
time to time. These include exit from one oc-
cupation into another or major business 
changes to improve chances for success. Fur-
ther, let's not let media coverage and our dis-
cussions of current financial problems sour the 
attitude of young people toward agriculture. 
There will be challenges and problems, but 
these are only the basic ingredients for accom-
plishment and success. 
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3. Assess the future role of FmHA. 
Farmers Home Administration has received 
minimal attention in the present crisis except as 
a means of pumping additional public funds into 
the agricultural sector. FmHA, as both a direct 
lender and as a conduit for public funds into the 
agricultural sector may well be outdated. 
Implementation of policy varies widely by 
county and state. Its authorities and mandates 
are so subject to political winds and whims that 
new policy barely gets to the grass roots before 
it is superseded or revised by a new directive. 
Further, influencing and overriding of 
individual credit decisions of professional staff 
by politicians on behalf of their constituents 
has become altogether too commonplace. 
The agency's farm lending authority probably 
should be terminated. Its programs should 
move in the direction of loan guarantees with 
no public funds to lend to agriculture and without 
use of bonds or Congressional appropriation for 
farm lending other than to underwrite the 
guarantees. If the direct lending role of 
Farmers Home Administration in agriculture is 
discontinued, we must be sure that any lender 
that takes over any of FmHA's current 
purposes or target groups is protected from 
improper political influence over individual 
loan decisions. 
4. Consider the future role of the 
Cooperative Farm Credit System (CFCS). 
One important issue concerns expanding lending 
clientele and services. Questions are already 
being raised with respect to servicing 
agribusinesses or rural businesses in general. 
Other possibilities include providing depos-
itory services or investment services. 
Another focus is structure and decisionmak-
ing. How should decisionmaking in the System 
be allocated among local, regional, and national 
levels in a new CFCS? PC As and Federal 
Land Bank Associations are being consolidated 
both into larger districts and into joint lending 
offices. Are district-wide PC As appropriate? 
Should districts themselves be combined? Is the 
system responsive as a farmer cooperative? In 
short, what is the proper balance between size 
of unit, centralization and decentralization for 
the system? 
Furthermore, are these consolidations ad-
dressing the right questions? It might be useful 
to contemplate the reasons for the present Brake 
problems in the CFCS portfolio. While the 
consolidations now taking place may gain 
small benefits in efficiency or economy, I 
question whether they would have prevented 
the massive problems of nonperforming loans 
that recently materialized. 
The answer to the nonperforming loan problem 
of the 80s was already in place in the Normal 
Agricultural Value (NAV) approach the 
System implemented in the 1930s. That con-
servative approach allowed lending only two-
thirds of "normal agricultural value". In a pe-
riod of rampant inflation, FLBAs could lend 
50% or less of "market value". But, that rule 
didn't permit expanding the CFCS market 
share; it didn't allow CFCS to outdo its com-
petitors. So the System asked, and the Con-
gress did away with the NAV. Lending limits 
were raised to 85% of current market value. 
Competition then led all lenders to excess. 
When asset values dropped by 50% or more in 
some areas within the 5 years from 1981—86, 
serious lender solvency problems resulted. 
Restructuring the CFCS into larger units may 
spread some risks, but it seems questionable 
whether such restructuring addresses the basic 
mistakes of the 70s. 
Finally, there is a new role to be carved out 
concerning the relationship between the Farm 
Credit Administration and the CFCS. The 
concept of "arm's length regulator" seems ap-
propriate, but the direct appointment of the 
FCA governing board in a political mode 
raises serious concerns about its ability to re-
main arms length. Influence over the distribu-
tion of money seems to invite political med-
dling, e.g. FmHA. 
5. Improve the quality of agricultural 
finance data. 
Bonnen and others have addressed the issue of 
data needs in the agricultural sector. Unfor-
tunately, other than addressing these issues in a 
general way, few specific suggestions or pro-
posals came forward. As David Stockman has 
said, much policy is made by those doing day-
to-day work with the numbers. How, then, do 
academics and other users of data get input 
into the data collection system? It seems to me 
that these users and the USDA professionals 
collecting the data have a need jointly to ex-
plore, on a continuing basis, conceptualization 
and data collection issues concerning the 
financial well-being of fanners. 
Emphasis on conceptualization and data in- 
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elude micro aspects as well. If one were to 
count the record-keeping systems being of-
fered to farmers for farm business analysis by 
public and private agencies, my guess is there 
would be a dozen, more or less, different sys-
tems. They use different concepts or the same 
concepts in different and inconsistent ways. 
Analyses of farm account data are not compa-
rable between states, nor between state and 
federal systems in general, nor are instruc-
tional materials comparable from different 
sources. 
The Coordinated Financial Statements for 
Agriculture proposed by Frey and Klinefelter 
were a significant step ahead relative to most 
of the systems being used before its introduc-
tion. It's time that we, in collaboration with 
private vendors, agree upon a set of coor-
dinated financial statements for agriculture in-
cluding the concept of value added. The basic 
importance of farm records to farm operators 
in financially stressful times cannot be over-
emphasized. Using and understanding a quality 
farm records system may be the most im-
portant single survival strategy available to a 
farm family. 
Perhaps part of our problem is that we tend 
to teach "farm records" rather than accounting 
with reference to small business. Let's initiate a 
commission with a charge to derive generally 
accepted farm accounting practices. 
6. Improve modeling of farm firms. 
For many years researchers have modeled farm 
firm growth, profitability and farm survival. 
Many of these models have ignored, or have 
not adequately included, cash flows. In 
particular, debt service requirements have 
typically been overlooked. While cash flows 
need not be a part of the objective function in a 
model, they should be incorporated into the 
constraint section of the model. The firm must 
meet its debt service requirements. There are, 
of course, ways to get around the debt-service 
constraints including refinancing and restruc-
turing of debt. 
7. Adjust sector financing to lower 
financial risks. 
A part of the recent agricultural finance prob-
lem has resulted because of the relatively high 
amount of debt financing in the 1970s and until 
about 1981. Given the overuse of debt financing 
in the late 1970s, certainly more con- 92    October 1986 
servative lending rules will be applied in the 
near future. 
Another approach to financial risks might 
utilize a higher proportion of equity capital— 
probably outside equity capital—in sector 
financing to improve risk bearing ability with 
respect to volatility in earnings and asset values. 
If this risk of changes in earnings and asset 
values is not addressed, the problems of the 
1930s and 1980s may well be repeated again in 
the 2020s or 2030s. 
Perhaps a future role for credit agencies will 
be to provide an investment banking function 
which brings together both debt and outside 
equity capital for a business depending upon 
its characteristics and needs. Also, in the long 
run, it will be necessary to effectively serve 
the needs of new entrants. 
Summary 
Let   me   quickly   summarize   several   major 
points. 
1) We must understand the underlying eco-
nomic forces at work. 
2) Policies to alleviate problems must truly 
address the problem and must be consistent 
with the underlying economic forces. 
3) The current financial stresses of the ag-
ricultural sector are not likely to be short term; 
so let's recognize the relative ineffectiveness 
of short term policy proposals, and emphasize 
long term policies. 
4) Efforts should be increased to help hu-
man resources make the transition out of ag-
riculture into useful nonfarming employment. 
5) Attention should be devoted to concep-
tualizing the data and information needs for 
describing financial characteristics of the ag-
ricultural sector. Let's also work toward gen-
erally accepted farm accounting practices. 
6) The future roles of the Farmers Home 
Administration and the Cooperative Farm 
Credit System need consideration now. 
7) Finally, let's adjust outmoded and ques-
tionable attitudes within the agricultural sec-
tor: recognize the reality of, and need to, 
change, improve decisionmaking skills, and 
give appropriate support and attention to needs 
of those families exiting the sector. 
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